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Fighting America’s Best-Selling
Product: An Analysis of and Solution to
the Opioid Crisis
Ashley Duckworth*
Abstract
Deaths from drug overdoses have doubled over the last ten
years and are now the leading cause of accidental death in the
United States. Although some overdoses may have involved more
than one drug, prescription and/or illicit opioids were involved in
many of these drug overdose fatalities. The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), Center for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), and Congress have enacted a string of regulations, statutes,
and programs since the early 1990s, but nothing has seriously
improved the opioid epidemic as it stands. If anything, the use of
opioids has persisted. Many people want pharmaceutical
companies to be held responsible, and although the companies can
be portrayed as the most at fault, they are not the only ones to blame.
Medical doctors have also contributed significantly to the opioid
crisis by prescribing large amounts of opioid painkillers to patients
when a smaller amount or lower dosage is adequate. The
relationship between pharmaceutical companies and doctors is the
root of the problem. The two have worked in tandem, perpetuating
the crisis. Although the opioid crisis itself is a matter of enormous
magnitude, this Note proposes that more intensive, yet reasonable,
federal action through the construction of a civil model law is
needed. A federal model law would include concepts like more
actively monitoring the distributorship of pharmaceutical
companies, regulating doctors’ prescribing habits, implementing a
tax or licensing fee against pharmaceutical companies, and making
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Law; B.A., 2017, Wofford College. Thank you to Professor Albert Carr for all your
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a more concerted effort to end prescription opioid addiction while
at the same time recognizing that there are individuals who need
opioids to manage their pain.
Part II of this Note provides a history of opioid use in the
United States, including background on the three periods of
increased opioid use, and provides examples of states that are most
affected. Part III analyzes regulations and statutes put in place
since the beginning of the current crisis and their overall failure to
remedy the crisis. Part III also evaluates the effectiveness of
regulations and statutes currently in place and acknowledges
proposed regulations and statutes. Part IV looks at the relationship
between pharmaceutical companies and doctors and explains how
these two groups create and control the availability of opioid
painkillers. Part V suggests remedying the opioid crisis with a more
constructive, yet intensive, federal model law encouraging doctors
to stop the extreme prescription of opioid painkillers while
simultaneously holding pharmaceutical companies accountable for
their actions.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ............................................................................. 239
II. Background ............................................................................ 242
A. History of Opioid Use in the United States ..................... 242
B. The Start of the Crisis ...................................................... 244
C. Examples of Where the Crisis Is Most Serious................ 246
III. Regulations and Their Failure ............................................. 248
A. Current Regulations and Guidelines ............................... 248
B. Newly Instated and Proposed Regulations and
Guidelines ........................................................................ 253
IV. The Pharmaceutical Companies’ Relationship with
Doctors ........................................................................................ 257
A. The Pharmaceutical Companies’ Role in the Crisis……..257
1. Early Contribution....................................................... 257
2. Current Contribution.................................................... 258
B. Doctors’ Role in the Crisis ............................................ 264

FIGHTING AMERICA’S BEST-SELLING PRODUCT

239

1. Bad Habits................................................................. 264
2. Recent Improvements .................................................. 267
V. Moving Forward ..................................................................... 268
A. The Creation of a Federal Model Law............................. 268
1. Monitoring the Pharmaceutical Companies................. 268
2. Regulating Prescribing Methods of Doctors ................. 271
3. Implementing a Financial Burden to
Pharmaceutical Companies .............................................. 273
4. Possible Roadblocks ...................................................... 274
VI. Conclusion ............................................................................. 277

I. Introduction
Driving through a small town in East Tennessee looks much
different than it did just twenty years ago.1 The landscape was
once a rural area, dotted with small farms and neighborhoods.2
Now, the hillsides are littered with abandoned or ragged-out
trailers and crack houses.3 The living conditions are stomachchurning.4 What was once a population composed of farmers,
1. Compare
Farming
Heritage,
TENN.
DEP’T
OF
AGRIC.,
https://www.tn.gov/agriculture/farms/heritage.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2019)
(describing Tennessee’s farming heritage and decline in farmland)
[https://perma.cc/7F5L-9FME], with Chris Salvemini, Transportation Structure
of East Tenn. Makes Region Drug Trafficking Hub, UT DAILY BEACON (Jan. 23,
2015),
http://www.utdailybeacon.com/news/transportation-structure-of-easttenn-makes-region-drug-trafficking-hub/article_b7b87651-328a-540e-b4c4c965e8cdc034.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (describing drug houses in
Tennessee) [https://perma.cc/G5X8-PLJH].
2. See Tennessee—Rural Definitions: State-Level Maps, U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC., https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/DataFiles/53180/25597_TN.pdf?v=0
(last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (showing maps that label parts of East Tennessee as
rural) [https://perma.cc/H4NN-V739].
3. See Salvemini, supra note 1 (explaining how East Tennessee has recently
seen an influx of drugs).
4. See Tim Craig, Homeless Deaths Surge, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/national/wp/2018/04/13/feature/surge-inhomeless-deaths-linked-to-opioids-extreme-weather-soaring-housing-cost/ (last
visited Nov. 25, 2019) (describing the deplorable living conditions that those who
have fallen victim to opioid abuse endure) [https://perma.cc/QNS4-56C3].

240

26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 237 (2019)

factory workers, and professionals is now a population subject to
lost hope and drug addiction.5
More than 72,000 Americans died from drug overdoses in
2017.6 Deaths from drug overdoses have doubled over the last ten
years, and are now the leading cause of accidental death in the
United States.7 Although some overdoses may have involved more
than one drug, “prescription and/or illicit opioids were involved in
66.4% (42,249) of these drug overdose fatalities.”8 Pharmaceutical
companies are often blamed for exacerbating the crisis because
they have encouraged the use of prescription opioids and
advertised the “non-addictive” nature of the drugs since the 1990s.9
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Center for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), and Congress have enacted a string
of regulations, statutes, and programs since the early 1990s, but
nothing has seriously improved the opioid epidemic as it stands.10
If anything, the use of opioids has persisted.11 “In 2017, 17.4% of
the U.S. population received one or more opioid prescriptions,”
averaging 3.4 prescriptions per person.12
5. See Clay Duda, On the Front Lines of Knoxville’s Battle Against Opiate
Addiction,
KNOXVILLE
MERCURY
(June
1,
2016),
http://www.knoxmercury.com/2016/06/01/front-lines-knoxvilles-battle-opiateaddiction/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (describing many individuals in East
Tennessee being addicted to opiates) [https://perma.cc/7M8W-5N8A].
6. See Nat’l Inst. on Drug Abuse, Overdose Death Rates, DRUGABUSE.GOV,
https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates
(last updated Jan. 2019) (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (describing the disturbing
statistics behind the opioid crisis) [https://perma.cc/4HR4-W4SB].
7. See id. (noting the stark increase in opioid related deaths).
8. CDC NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, 2018 ANNUAL
SURVEILLANCE REPORT OF DRUG-RELATED RISKS AND OUTCOMES 7 (2018).
9. See Lindsey Liu, Diana N. Pei & Pela Soto, History of the Opioid
Epidemic: How Did We Get Here?, NAT’L CAP. POISON CTR.,
https://www.poison.org/articles/opioid-epidemic-history-and-prescribingpatterns-182 (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (describing the beginning stages of the
opioid crisis) [ https://perma.cc/S3CC-YUYY].
10. See RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., PAIN MANAGEMENT AND THE OPIOID
EPIDEMIC: BALANCING SOCIETAL AND INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS AND RISKS OF
PRESCRIPTION OPIOID USE 276–94 (2017) (noting that nothing the government has
done thus far has significantly helped the state of America’s opioid addiction).
11. See CDC NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, supra note 8,
at 6 (describing the fact that opioid use and addiction continues to increase).
12. CDC NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, supra note 8, at
6.
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Many people want pharmaceutical companies to be held
responsible, and although the companies can be portrayed as the
most at fault, they are not the only ones to blame.13 Medical doctors
have also contributed significantly to the opioid crisis by
prescribing large amounts of opioid painkillers to patients when a
smaller amount or lower dosage is adequate.14 In addition to the
legal instances, the number of doctors who illegally prescribe pain
medication for profit have also contributed to the epidemic.15
The relationship between pharmaceutical companies and
doctors is the root of the problem.16 The two have worked in
tandem, perpetuating the crisis through pharmaceutical
companies offering benefits to doctors for prescribing certain
amounts of opioid painkillers, and doctors reaping the rewards.17
Although the opioid crisis itself is a matter of enormous
magnitude, this Note proposes that more intensive, yet reasonable,
federal action through the construction of a civil model law is
needed.18 The criminal aspects, although significant to the crisis,
are not discussed because the illicit behavior contributing to the
crisis is difficult to regulate.19 A federal model law would include
13. See City of Chicago v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 211 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1062–
64 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (providing a prime example of courts holding pharmaceutical
companies responsible).
14. See Nat’l Inst. on Drug Abuse, supra note 6 (describing the contribution
of doctors to the opioid crisis).
15. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Moody Pill Mill Doctor Charged with
Illegal Prescribing (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndal/pr/moodypill-mill-doctor-charged-illegal-prescribing (last visited Nov. 25, 2019)
[hereinafter Moody Pill Mill Doctor] (referencing one of many instances that the
DOJ is currently fighting where doctors illegally prescribe opioids for financial
benefit) [https://perma.cc/2PW2-W67J].
16. See Sheryl Calabro, Breaking the Shield of the Learned Intermediary
Doctrine: Placing the Blame Where It Belongs, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 2241, 2256–
57 (2004) (noting that doctors and pharmaceutical companies are both to blame
for the state of the crisis as opposed to one over the other).
17. See id. (describing the relationship between doctors and pharmaceutical
companies along with the incentives attached to maximizing the sale of opioids).
18. See infra Part V (describing the creation of a civil model law and
potential roadblocks).
19. See Trends in Opioid Use, Harms, and Treatment, NAT’L CTR. FOR
BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO., https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK458661/ (last
visited Nov. 25, 2019) (explaining the impact of those involved in the criminal
justice system on the opioid crisis and suggesting solutions that do not involve
regulation) [https://perma.cc/Z8CW-L24P].
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concepts like more actively monitoring the distributorship of
pharmaceutical companies, regulating doctors’ prescribing habits,
implementing a tax or licensing fee against pharmaceutical
companies, and making a more concerted effort to end prescription
opioid addiction while at the same time recognizing that there are
individuals who need opioids to manage their pain.20
Part II provides a history of opioid use in the United States,
including background on the three periods of increased opioid use,
and provides examples of states that are most affected.21
Part III analyzes regulations and statutes put in place since
the beginning of the current crisis and their overall failure to
remedy the crisis.22 Part III also evaluates the effectiveness of
regulations and statutes currently in place and acknowledges
proposed regulations and statutes.23
Part IV looks at the relationship between pharmaceutical
companies and doctors and explains how these two groups create
and control the availability of opioid painkillers.24
Part V suggests remedying the opioid crisis with a more
constructive, yet intensive, federal model law encouraging doctors
to stop the extreme prescription of opioid painkillers while
simultaneously holding pharmaceutical companies accountable for
their actions.25
II. Background
A. History of Opioid Use in the United States
The final quarter of the twentieth century brought about the
acceptance of opioids in mainstream medical practice and
20. See infra Part V (proposing a new federal model law).
21. See infra Part II (documenting the history of opioid use in the United
States).
22. See infra Part III (examining regulations, statutes, and their failure to
remedy the opioid crisis).
23. See infra Part III (evaluating proposed statutes and regulations aimed
at curbing the opioid crisis).
24. See infra Part IV (explaining the interplay between doctors and
pharmaceutical companies as it relates to the prescription of opioids).
25. See infra Part V (describing a possible remedy to the opioid crisis).
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treatment.26 Prior to the 1980s, opioid use was minimal.27 In fact,
physicians and nurses were trained to give minimal opioids for
pain, unless death seemed imminent.28 This mindset changed as
researchers and specialists determined chronic pain was vastly
undertreated.29 Highly influential articles and studies were
published in the 1980s reporting on the low incidence of addictive
behavior.30 These articles claimed there was “no published
long-term data that gave evidence of high addiction rates among
pain patients.”31 A large number of doctors, patients, and opioid
manufacturers supported these results, and within a decade, pain
management had changed.32 By 1996, the American Society of
Anesthesiology adopted a new set of guidelines for treating chronic
pain including recommendations about evaluating patients for
drug therapies involving opioids.33 At that point, opioids became a
staple form of pain reliever.34

26. See Hilary Homenko, Rehabilitating Opioid Regulation: A Prescription
for the FDA’s Next Proposal of an Opioid Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy
(REMS), 22 HEALTH MATRIX 273, 277–78 (2012) (describing the earlier history of
opioids in America).
27. See Marcia L. Meldrum, The Ongoing Opioid Prescription Epidemic:
Historical Context, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1365, 1365 (2016) (providing that
opioid use prior to the introduction of persuasive research articles on their
non-addictive nature was minimal).
28. See id. (emphasizing that opioid use was minimal prior to the 1980s and
that opioids were only used in emergencies).
29. See id. (noting that the introduction of opioid use as a more normal
treatment for pain was in response to the need to treat pain better).
30. See id. (referencing the research articles written in the 1980s telling
individuals that opioids were safe to use and non-addictive).
31. Id.
32. See id. (describing how, after the results supporting opioid use for pain
treatment were released, the rest of the industry quickly caught up and supported
opioid use).
33. See Homenko, supra note 26, at 277–78 (referring to the guidelines
established by the late 1990s for assisting patients and doctors with the use of
opioids and how to do so properly).
34. See Homenko, supra note 26, at 277–78 (“Opioid pain relievers commonly
used today include morphine, hydrocodone, and oxycodone.”).
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B. The Start of the Crisis

One way to map the escalation of the opioid crisis is by the
number of overdose deaths from opioid use.35 As the number of
deaths increased, the crisis arguably intensified.36 The timeline
illustrating this can be broken down into three waves.37 “The first
wave began with the increased prescribing of opioids in the 1990s,
with overdose deaths involving prescription opioids (natural and
semi-synthetic opioids and methadone) increasing since 1999.”38
This was the foundation of the crisis.39 Prescription painkillers
were prescribed at alarming rates, causing mass dependency
issues that are still prevalent and increasing today.40
Reassurances given to prescribers by pharmaceutical companies
and medical societies claiming that the risk of addiction to
prescription opioids was very low contributed to increased
prescription rates.41 Pharmaceutical companies also began
promoting the use of opioids in patients with non-cancer related
pain, and by 1999, eighty-six percent of patients using opioids were
using them for non-cancer pain.42 With the increase in opioid
usage, communities where opioids were made available and

35. See
Opioid
Overdose,
CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugover
dose/data/analysis.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (describing the general
mapping of the opioid crisis from its start in the 1980s to the 2010s)
[https://perma.cc/LDQ9-HSLH].
36. Id.
37. See id. (“This rise in opioid overdose deaths can be outlined in three
distinct waves.”).
38. Id.
39. See Kate Vidinsky, Opioid Crisis: This Doctor’s Street-Level Views Could
Change the Course of the Epidemic, UNIV. CAL. S.F. (June 12, 2018),
https://www.ucsf.edu/news/2018/06/410636/opioid-crisis-doctors-street-levelviews-could-change-course-epidemic (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (“The
foundational base of the crisis . . . was the prescription painkiller epidemic.”)
[https://perma.cc/P3M4-8M2H].
40. See id. (“Powerful opiates were prescribed at alarming rates, causing
mass dependency issues that continue today.”).
41. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (“The increase in opioid prescriptions
was influenced by reassurances given to prescribers by pharmaceutical
companies and medical societies claiming that the risk of addiction to prescription
opioids was very low.”).
42. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (“By 1999, 86% of patients using opioids
were using them for non-cancer pain.”).
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prescribed generously were the first places to experience increased
opioid abuse.43
“The second wave began in 2010, with rapid increases in
overdose deaths involving heroin.”44 As early efforts to decrease
opioid prescribing by making them harder to obtain came into
force, addicts turned to heroin.45 Heroin was a cheaper and more
widely available illegal opioid that increased in use as prescription
drug patients and other new users combined into a larger force of
addicts.46 The increase in heroin usage is evident in statistics as
overdose deaths due to heroin increased by 286% from 2002 to
2013.47 Approximately eighty percent of heroin users admitted to
misusing prescription opioids before turning to heroin, illustrating
the connection in use.48
“The third wave began in 2013, with significant increases in
overdose deaths involving synthetic opioids, particularly those
involving illicitly manufactured fentanyl (IMF).”49 The nation is
currently grappling with this problematic IMF market involving
heroin, counterfeit pills, opioids, and cocaine, which continues to
evolve and worsen.50 However, most often, addiction begins with a
legal prescription for an opioid painkiller.51

43. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (“Communities where opioids were
readily available and prescribed liberally were the first places to experience
increased opioid abuse and diversion.”).
44. Opioid Overdose, supra note 35.
45. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (“As early efforts to decrease opioid
prescribing began to take effect, making prescription opioids harder to obtain, the
focus turned to heroin, a cheap, widely available, and potent illegal opioid.”).
46. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (referencing the increase in usage of
heroin because they were cheaper and more available than prescription opioids);
see also Vidinsky, supra note 39 (noting that prescription opioids served as a sort
of gateway drug to illegal use of illicit drugs that were obtained more cheaply).
47. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (“Deaths due to heroin-related overdose
increased by 286% from 2002 to 2013 . . . .”).
48. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (“[A]pproximately 80% of heroin users
admitted to misusing prescription opioids before turning to heroin.”).
49. Opioid Overdose, supra note 35.
50. See Opioid Overdose, supra note 35 (describing the IMF market).
51. See Opioid Overdose, supra note 35 (describing how the mixing of other
drugs with prescription opioids is a significant proportion of drug overdose
deaths).
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C. Examples of Where the Crisis Is Most Serious

The opioid crisis is generally more serious in rural and
impoverished areas.52 The Appalachian region, in particular, has
higher overdose death rates than the rest of the country.53 There
is also a correlation between overdose death rates, high rates of
poverty, and individuals with low rates of educational
attainment.54 Such characteristics are prevalent in Appalachia.55
Predictably, compared to the country as a whole, “Appalachian
residents are 55 percent more likely to die from drug overdoses.”56
West Virginia and Tennessee offer two instructive examples for
analysis.57
West Virginia has the highest drug overdose death rate in the
nation at fifty-two overdose deaths per 100,000.58 These numbers
are comprised of both intentional and unintentional drug
overdoses that reflect a statewide problem.59 The state is “ground
zero” of the opioid crisis and has been experiencing a public health
epidemic of drug overdose deaths for more than a decade.60 The
52. See Leonard J. Paulozzi et al., Vital Signs: Overdoses of Prescription
Opioid Pain Relievers—United States, 1999–2008, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY REP. 1487, 1487–92 (2011) (“More rural and more impoverished counties
tend to have higher prescription drug overdose death rates.”).
53. See Aaron Payne, CDC Outlines Plan to Address Ohio Valley’s Opioid
Crisis, W. VA. PUB. BROAD. (Mar. 22, 2018), http://www.wvpublic.org/post/cdcoutlines-plan-address-ohio-valleys-opioid-crisis-0 (last visited Nov. 25, 2019)
(“The Appalachian Region has been taking a disproportionate hit in overdose
deaths in relation to the rest of the country.”) [https://perma.cc/Y8Q3-6CCU].
54. See id. (describing the strong correlation between overdose deaths and
areas with high rates of poverty, people on disability, and low rates of educational
attainment).
55. See id. (illustrating the characteristics that correlate between opioid
overdoses and the Appalachian region overlap).
56. Id.
57. See infra notes 58–65 and accompanying text (describing the opioid crisis
in West Virginia); see also infra notes 66–71 and accompanying text (describing
the opioid crisis in Tennessee).
58. CDC NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, supra note 8, at
26.
59. See W. VA. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN RES. BUREAU FOR PUB. HEALTH,
WEST VIRGINIA DRUG OVERDOSE DEATHS HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 2001–2015 4
(2017) (noting that all areas of the state are affected by opioid abuse).
60. See United States v. Walker, No. 2:17-cr-00010, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
98233, at *7 (S.D. W. Va. June 26, 2017) (explaining the cultural context of the
opioid crisis and the havoc wreaked on West Virginia).
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details embedded in the data can be chilling.61 Just one night in
2016, twenty-six individuals overdosed in Cabell County, West
Virginia.62 The sheer number of the calls overwhelmed police and
EMS responders, and although this was an extraordinary case in
terms of the number of individuals that overdosed, unfortunate
overdoses happen all too often in West Virginia.63 The opioid crisis
is even reflected in West Virginia’s case law.64 The epidemic must
be explained in depth in order for others to grasp the cultural
context of the area and the fact that the “opioid crisis is a cancer
that has grown and metastasized in the body politic of the United
States.”65
Tennessee provides an alternative example of how the crisis
has progressed through the Appalachian region.66 In Tennessee,
the opioid prescribing rate was 94.4 per 100 persons in 2017, the
third highest in the nation behind Alabama and Arkansas.67
Moreover, “[i]n 2016, there were 1,186 opioid-related overdose
deaths in Tennessee—a rate of 18.1 deaths per 100,000 persons—
higher than the national rate of 13.3 deaths per 100,000 persons.”68
To put this number into perspective, these are more lives than the

61. See id. (discussing the dire effects the opioid crisis has had on West
Virginia).
62. See Taylor Stuck, 26 Overdoses Reported Monday Evening, HERALD
DISPATCH (Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.herald-dispatch.com/news/overdosesreported-monday-evening/article_81990238-4a74-5431-9420-76e0f35c5cbf.html
(last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (providing a newspaper report on twenty-six
individuals overdosing in Huntington, West Virginia) [https://perma.cc/Q2JUY3TM].
63. See id. (“By 9 p.m., 26 overdoses had been reported, more than Cabell
County EMS responds to in a week.”).
64. See Walker, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98233, at *7 (“The plea agreement
proffered by the parties in this case was made in the context of a clear, present,
and deadly heroin and opioid crisis in this community.”).
65. Id.
66. See Mandy Pellegrin & Courtnee Melton, The Opioid Epidemic in
Tennessee: 2018 Update on Indicators of Progress, SYCAMORE INST. (Aug. 9, 2018),
https://www.sycamoreinstitutetn.org/2018/08/09/opioid-epidemic-tn-indicators/
(last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (clarifying that the situation in Tennessee concerning
the opioid crisis is still worsening) [https://perma.cc/VBN4-5LPS].
67. See CDC NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, supra note 8,
at 11 (noting that these numbers may seem distorted but that several individuals
have multiple prescriptions for opioids, inflating the numbers).
68. Nat’l Inst. on Drug Abuse, supra note 6.
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state lost in combat during the entire Vietnam War.69 To provide
an alternative example, in July of 2009, members of a Tennessee
drug task force seized several one-hundred-tablet bottles of
oxycodone made by the pharmaceutical company Mallinckrodt.70
Task-force agents alerted Mallinckrodt because the company’s lot
numbers were printed on the labels, allowing for easy tracking of
the pills, but rather than taking action to halt the extreme amount
of opioids being sent to the state, Mallinckrodt continued shipping
pills knowing that they would more than likely be misused.71
Although Tennessee as a whole is not the worst case, an afternoon
observing an East Tennessee criminal courtroom illustrates
countless cases almost all dealing with drugs, repeat offenders,
and an obvious problem with opioids.72
III. Regulations and Their Failure
A. Current Regulations and Guidelines
A significant number of statutes and regulations have been
implemented to combat the crisis.73 However, attempts at
regulating and lawmaking have proven largely ineffective thus
69. See Phil Roe, Working Together to Tackle the Opioid Epidemic,
GREENEVILLE
SUN
(June
15,
2018),
https://www.greenevillesun.com/opinion/local_columns/working-together-totackle-the-opioid-epidemic/article_a3809b78-7740-5fcf-9d4c-cfa114951da8.html
(last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (comparing the death toll from opiates in Tennessee
with the death toll of soldiers from the state during the Vietnam War)
[https://perma.cc/4W5B-RLW7].
70. Lenny Bernstein & Scott Higham, Major DEA Opioid Case Falters on
Uncertain Legal Ground, HERALD NET (Apr. 2, 2017, 5:54 PM),
https://www.heraldnet.com/news/major-dea-opioid-case-falters-on-uncertainlegal-ground/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) [https://perma.cc/F52U-DRBE].
71. See id. (noting that Mallinckrodt was held accountable for its
transgressions in a $35 million settlement yet still found itself blameless).
72. See Court Responses to the Opioid Epidemic: Happening Now, CTR. FOR
CT.
INNOVATION,
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/
media/documents/2019-07/handout_happeningnow_pageview_07112019.pdf (last
visited Nov. 25, 2019) (describing a new docket created in Tennessee courts which
implements new strategies for helping those involved in opioid-related cases)
[https://perma.cc/2ZFG-CVVN].
73. See infra notes 75–107 (describing several attempts at regulating and
law-making in an attempt to combat the opioid epidemic).
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far.74 President Trump issued an executive order in November of
2017 authorizing the executive branch “to combat the scourge of
drug abuse, addiction, and overdose (drug addiction), including
opioid abuse, addiction, and overdose (opioid crisis).”75 This order
established the President’s Commission on Combating Drug
Addiction and the Opioid Crisis, which is composed of members
designated or appointed by the President.76 The mission of the
Commission is “to study the scope and effectiveness of the [f]ederal
response to drug addiction and the opioid crisis described . . . and
to make recommendations to the President for improving that
response.”77 The results from the Committee’s recommendations
are still developing, and mainly call for better strategized federal
funding, better agency action, better opioid addiction treatment
programs, and better education on opioid addiction and the crisis
itself.78
In terms of governing statutes and guidelines, the CDC
recently issued a set of comprehensive guidelines for prescribing
opioids for chronic pain outside of cancer treatment, palliative
care, and end-of-life care.79 These guidelines were promulgated in
an effort to reduce the risk and maximize the benefits of available
pain treatment options.80 Congress has also made multiple
findings and declarations regarding controlled substances, with 21
U.S.C. § 801 serving as a prime example.81 This statute, also
74. See
Provisional
Drug
Overdose
Death
Counts,
CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/drug-overdose-data.htm (last visited Nov. 25,
2019) (showing the number of deaths from opioid abuse to be largely flat or
slightly decreasing since late 2017) [https://perma.cc/4D6N-89E3].
75. Exec. Order No. 13784, 82 Fed. Reg. 16283 (Mar. 29, 2017).
76. See id. (providing that the Commission reports to the President on its
findings in helping to solve the opioid crisis).
77. Id.
78. See THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON COMBATING DRUG ADDICTION AND
THE OPIOID CRISIS (2017) (explaining that previous methods have been ineffective
and that, in the future, the government needs to focus on better funding and
strategizing).
79. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (providing that non-opioid treatments
are the preferred first step for treatment of chronic pain, and opioid medications
should only be added after careful assessment of pain control and followed by
regular evaluations of their continued need).
80. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (providing the reasoning for the CDC
issuing these guidelines).
81. See 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2018) (providing an example of one of the many
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known as the Controlled Substances Act, establishes that although
many drugs have a
useful and legitimate medical purpose and are necessary to
maintain the health and general welfare of the American
people . . . the illegal importation, manufacture, distribution,
and possession and improper use of controlled substances have
a substantial and detrimental effect on the health and general
welfare of the American people.82

However, the statute acts as a set of guidelines as opposed to
laws that put actual limits and repercussions into place.83
In contrast to the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.
§ 355-1, part of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
prescribes steps to determine whether a drug is safe and how to
administer it properly to the public, including risk evaluation and
mitigation strategies.84 The statute “gave the FDA more authority
to regulate prescription drugs, including prescription pain
relievers known as opioids.”85
Another example of a stricter statute is 21 U.S.C. § 333, which
is also a part of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.86 This
statute puts into place specific penalties regarding drug market
violations and is fairly detailed.87 On its face, 21 U.S.C. § 333
appears to have the potential to be effective in combating the crisis
because of its penalties for violators.88 However, the latest
amendments to the statute were made in 2017, and unfortunately,
not much improvement has been seen since then.89
findings released by Congress regarding opioids and controlled substances).
82. Id.
83. See id. (illustrating that the statute itself is mainly a list of looser
suggestions and guidelines).
84. Id. § 355-1.
85. Homenko, supra note 26, at 290.
86. See 21 U.S.C. § 333 (2018) (describing specific penalties for failing to
comply with the Act).
87. See id. (explaining that failing to comply results in a fine or
imprisonment).
88. See id. (analyzing the statute as providing effective assistance in ending
crisis because of the penalties in place).
89. See id. (providing that the 2017 amendment only added that “knowingly
making, selling or dispensing, or holding for sale or dispensing, a counterfeit drug
shall be imprisoned for not more than 10 years or fined in accordance with title
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There are relatively few administrative regulations that
govern the conduct of practitioners who prescribe opioids.90 For
example, 21 C.F.R. 1306.07 states that “a practitioner may
administer or dispense directly . . . a narcotic drug listed in any
schedule to a narcotic dependent person for the purpose of
maintenance or detoxification treatment.”91 However, the
practitioner must be “separately registered with DEA as a narcotic
treatment program” and remain “in compliance with DEA
regulations regarding treatment qualifications, security, records,
and unsupervised use of the drugs pursuant to the Act.”92 21 C.F.R.
1306.07 essentially qualifies practitioners to administer opioids for
the purpose of treating individuals going through withdraw.93
More treatment and accreditation programs similar to those
prescribed by 21 C.F.R. 1306.07 are also reinforced by 42 C.F.R.
8.2.94
21 C.F.R. 1301.28 establishes that “[n]othing in this section
shall prohibit a physician who is not specifically registered to
conduct a narcotic treatment program from administering (but not
prescribing) narcotic drugs to a person for the purpose of relieving
acute withdrawal symptoms.”95 However, the regulation only
allows administering drugs to individuals in this manner “when
necessary while arrangements are being made for referral for
treatment.”96 “This section is not intended to impose any
limitations on a physician or authorized hospital staff to
administer or dispense narcotic drugs in a hospital to maintain or
detoxify a person as an incidental adjunct to medical or surgical
treatment of conditions other than addiction . . . .”97 Overall, 21
18, United States Code, or both.”).
90. See infra notes 91–98 (describing the administrative regulations that
govern the conduct of practitioners who prescribe opioids).
91. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.07 (2005).
92. Id.
93. See id. (providing that the main thrust of the regulation deals with
individuals going through opioid withdrawal as opposed to regulating opioids
themselves).
94. See 42 C.F.R. § 8.2 (2016) (providing a set of definitions regarding
accreditation and opioid treatment programs).
95. 21 C.F.R. § 1301.28 (2018).
96. Id.
97. Id.
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C.F.R. 1301.28 once again authorizes practitioners to administer
narcotics in order to maintain or detoxify a person.98 With the
regulations 21 C.F.R. 1306.07 and 21 C.F.R. 1301.28 in mind, there
are not many federal regulations explicitly describing how to
regulate opioids beyond when to administer opioids to individuals
who have overdosed or are going through withdraw.99 The
regulating itself seems to have been left mostly with the legislature
and governing statutes.100
Federal and state enforcement authorities have also devoted a
considerable amount of resources to prohibiting kickbacks, bribes,
rebates, and gifts from pharmaceutical companies to doctors.101
Congress has added onto an anti-kickback statute over the past
several years, and most recently amended it in 2018, which
provides:
Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any
remuneration (including kickback, bribe or rebate) directly or
indirectly, overtly or covertly, in case or in kind in return for
referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or
arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which
payment may be made in whole or in part under a [f]ederal
health care program, or in return for purchasing, leasing, or
ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment
may be made in whole or in part under a [f]ederal health care
program shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof,
shall be fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned for not
more than ten years or both.102

However, the statute only applies to services covered by federal or
state-funded healthcare programs, not to all prescription drugs.103
98. See id. (illustrating another statute that focuses on regulating the
administration of drugs in response to an opioid overdose).
99. See id. (explaining the exemption from separate registration for
practitioners dispensing or prescribing drugs specifically for use in maintenance
or detoxification treatment); see also 21 C.F.R. § 1306.07 (2005) (providing
guidelines to practitioners for administering narcotics).
100. See supra notes 75–88, infra notes 101–104 (describing governing
statutes and actions by legislatures to regulate opioids).
101. See Calabro, supra note 16, at 2260 (describing the kickbacks and bribes
the pharmaceutical companies were providing to doctors that authorities sought
to eliminate).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b (2012).
103. See Calabro, supra note 16, at 2260 (describing to whom and what the
statute applies and its general shortcomings).
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Hence, many pharmaceutical companies’ practices that would
otherwise violate the statute have been permitted without legal
implication.104
Congress also recently passed the Eliminating Kickbacks in
Recovery Act of 2018, which makes it a criminal offense to “solicit
or receive any remuneration . . . directly or indirectly, in return for
referring a patient or patronage to a recovery home, clinical
treatment facility or clinical laboratory.”105 The Act criminalizes
any offers or payments of kickbacks to “induce a referral of an
individual to a recovery home, clinical treatment facility or clinical
laboratory, or in exchange for an individual using the services of a
recovery home, clinical treatment facility or clinical laboratory.”106
Being fairly recently enacted, it remains to be seen whether the
law will be effective, but it mainly affects the clinical laboratory
industry and illustrates Congress’s continued efforts to help the
opioid crisis and root out corruption in the industry.107
B. Newly Instated and Proposed Regulations and Guidelines
Bills are constantly being presented to Congress to hold
pharmaceutical companies directly accountable for their role in the
opioid crisis.108 Although a bill that was intended “to hold
pharmaceutical companies accountable for illegal marketing and
distribution of opioid products and for their role in creating and
104. See Calabro, supra note 16, at 2260 (illustrating the essential loophole in
the statute allowing for questionable modes of operation to be used by
pharmaceutical companies).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 220 (2018).
106. Id.
107. See Edward J. Cyran, New Anti-Kickback Law Targets Opioid Crisis, FOX
ROTHSCHILD
LLP
(Nov.
20,
2018),
https://physicianlaw.foxrothschild.com/2018/11/articles/fraud-and-abuse/newanti-kickback-law-targets-opioid-crisis/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (discussing
the impacts of the Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act of 2018 and the fact
that it mostly affects clinical laboratories) [https://perma.cc/MSY5-YM4G].
108. See Margot Sanger-Katz & Thomas Kaplan, Congress Is Writing Lots of
Opioid Bills. But Which Ones Will Actually Help?, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/upshot/congress-is-writing-lots-of-opioidbills-but-which-ones-will-actually-help.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (“If the
opioid crisis could be solved by the sheer weight of proposed legislation, Congress
would be able to pat itself on the back.”) [https://perma.cc/T2GP-YXCX].
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exacerbating the opioid epidemic in the United States” recently
failed, others are frequently introduced because this is an issue of
grave national concern.109 House Bill 5782 was intended to amend
21 U.S.C. § 333 by prohibiting illegal marketing and distribution
practices with respect to opioids and putting in place a system in
which violators are penalized for non-compliance.110 The
implementation of this statute would have meant a harsher stance
against pharmaceutical companies, and even though it failed,
others like it will surely follow.111
With the failure of this bill, another recently took its place.112
In 2018, the U.S. Senate voted on the Opioid Crisis Package,
including $50 million “to help state education agencies, school
districts, and tribal governments increase evidence-based trauma
support services and mental health care.”113 The bill also allocates
$20 million in annual funding for state and local governments and
nonprofits to develop and run residential treatment programs
along with plans for regulatory fixes.114 These fixes include
expanding access to treatment for those in Medicaid and blocking
shipments of opioids.115 Although bills like the Opioid Crisis
Package are typically applauded as a bipartisan effort, some worry
that this bill does not go nearly as far as Congress has gone in the
past to support research and grant funding for epidemics.116 This
109. H.R. 5782, 115th Cong. (2018).
110. See id. (referring to the changes asked for in the Opioid Crisis and
Accountability Act); see also 21 U.S.C. § 333 (2018) (setting forth penalties for
prescription marketing and distribution violations).
111. See H.R. 5782 (arguing for a harsher penalty against pharmaceutical
companies and doctors).
112. See Liz Farmer, The Week in Public Finance: States Intent on Taxing Big
Pharma over the Opioid Crisis, GOVERNING: THE STATES & LOCALITIES (Oct. 5,
2018,
3:00
AM),
http://www.governing.com/week-in-finance/gov-taxingpharmaceutical-industry-opioid-crisis.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (reporting
on the Opioid Crisis Package passed by Congress in the fall of 2018)
[https://perma.cc/4EKF-TPSZ].
113. Id.
114. See id. (explaining the different elements supported and provided by the
new act which could prove beneficial in the coming year to helping end the opioid
crisis).
115. See id. (explaining different regulatory fixes aimed at ending the opioid
crisis).
116. See id. (providing the Ryan White Care Act, passed in 1990—which to
this day allows for billions in treatment and support for people with HIV and

FIGHTING AMERICA’S BEST-SELLING PRODUCT

255

brings concern about how serious Congress is about fixing the
opioid crisis.117
States are also considering taxation as a way to handle the
opioid crisis.118 Lawmakers have sought to raise taxes on
pharmaceutical companies in order to help pay for the cost of the
opioid crisis while at the same time imposing a vice-like tax on the
industry.119 A tax like this is comparable to the large amount of
licensing fees liquor stores have to pay in order to sell alcohol.120
In theory, the tax would raise millions “in new annual funding for
abuse prevention and treatment efforts by charging
pharmaceutical companies a fee for every opioid painkiller they
sell.”121 However, the possibility of these taxes passing in the
immediate future looks bleak.122 California, Delaware, Iowa,
Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New
Jersey, Tennessee, and Vermont all tried and failed to pass opioid
taxes in 2018, and although lawmakers in those states said they
would try again in 2019, the only state where a tax like this had
passed at the time of the writing of this Note was New York.123
Even in New York, however, the legislation was placed on hold
due to a lawsuit filed by the pharmaceutical industry in the
summer of 2018 and was subsequently struck down by a U.S.
district court in December of 2018.124 U.S. District Judge
AIDS—as an example).
117. Id.
118. See id. (reporting on state attempts to hold pharmaceutical companies
responsible for the opioid crisis by imposing a tax).
119. See id. (noting a plan to help the opioid crisis that is steadily growing in
popularity amongst lawmakers and government officials).
120. See id. (“Liquor stores and bars pay thousands of dollars each year for
the privilege of selling alcohol . . . but drug companies only pay a few hundred
dollars in licensing fees.”).
121. Id.
122. See id. (describing how heavy lobbying by pharmaceutical companies has
prevented bills setting a tax for the sale of opioid painkillers).
123. See id. (explaining how the tax in New York raises $100 million a year
for addiction treatment, prevention, and education through a tax on
pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors).
124. See Sara Randazzo, Federal Judge Strikes Down New York Tax on Opioid
Industry,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Dec.
19,
2018,
4:00
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-judge-strikes-down-new-york-tax-on-opioidindustry-11545253207 (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (“A federal judge struck down
Wednesday a New York law that aimed to collect $600 million from the
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Katherine Polk Failla called the law “an unconstitutional
regulatory penalty on the makers and distributors of opioid
painkillers.”125 Even though she acknowledged the validity of
trying to legislate a solution to the epidemic, she ruled the law
unconstitutional based on the Dormant Commerce Clause, which
prohibits
state
regulation
of
interstate
commerce.126
Pharmaceutical companies also continue to assert that
prescription medications are important and needed by some
patients, and the proposed laws would make access to the drugs by
those individuals much more difficult.127 Arguments on behalf of
pharmaceutical companies along with constitutional arguments
presented in court make it unlikely that a successful tax initiative
against pharmaceutical companies will pass anytime soon, but
they should be kept in mind as more individuals begin to take a
stand against pharmaceutical companies and more courts take on
these cases.128

pharmaceutical
industry
to
help
combat
the
opioid
crisis.”)
[https://perma.cc/F9AU-5ZGS]; see also Healthcare Distrib. All. v. Zucker, Nos.
18 Civ. 6168 (KPF); 18 Civ. 8180 (KPF); 18 Civ. 9830 (KPF), 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 213661, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2018) (“The OSA is not a tax, but is rather
a regulatory penalty on opioid manufacturers and distributors.”).
125. Randazzo, supra note 124.
126. See Randazzo, supra note 124 (“A federal judge struck down Wednesday
a New York law that aimed to collect $600 million from the pharmaceutical
industry to help combat the opioid crisis.”); see also Healthcare Distrib. All., 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213661, at *4 (“[T]he method by which the Act extracts
payments from opioid manufactures and distributors to redress those concerns
violates the Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.”); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (setting forth the Commerce Clause, from which the
Dormant Commerce Clause is inferred).
127. See Farmer, supra note 112 (referring to the PhRMA deputy vice
president’s statement on making sure the people who needed prescription opioids
were able to access them).
128. See Purdue Pharma Tentatively Settles Thousands of Opioid Cases, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/11/health/purduepharma-opioids-settlement.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (citing the deal in
which Purdue settled to pay $3 billion along with various other settlement terms
in light of their role in the opioid crisis) [https://perma.cc/M3R6-R7RZ]; see also
Randazzo, supra note 124 (referencing the U.S. district court in Ohio that cleared
the way for a large group of consolidated opioid tax-related lawsuits to move
forward over the objections of the defendants).
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IV. The Pharmaceutical Companies’ Relationship with Doctors
A. The Pharmaceutical Companies’ Role in the Crisis
1. Early Contribution
In the early years of the crisis, “[t]he increase in opioid
prescriptions was influenced by reassurances given to prescribers
by pharmaceutical companies and medical societies claiming that
the risk of addiction to prescription opioids was very low.”129
Pharmaceutical companies were promoting the use of opioids with
non-cancer-related pain regardless of the lack of data regarding
the risks and benefits to these patients.130 By 1999, eighty-six
percent of patients using opioids were using them for non-cancerrelated pain.131 The introduction of OxyContin by Purdue Pharma
in 1996 was a landmark event in the early years of the crisis.132
Shortly after its introduction, the sale of OxyContin skyrocketed.133
However, the large increase in sales was not without great effort
on behalf of Purdue Pharma.134 The pharmaceutical company
relied heavily on an unprecedented and rigorously financed
promotional and marketing campaign for the new drug.135
Thousands of doctors were treated to all-expenses-paid pain
management conferences in resort communities. An additional
twenty thousand other pain-related educational programs
sponsored Purdue Pharma between 1996 and 2002 were
available to doctors free of charge. The company sent out mass
mailings of promotional materials to physicians and paid
129. Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9.
130. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (describing the pharmaceutical
companies’ promotion of opioids in the early 1990s based on the relatively little
research articles released at the time and with little to no actual data).
131. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (providing a timeline on the progression
of the opioid crisis and possible reason why the opioid crisis progressed).
132. See STEPHEN L. FISHER & BARBARA E. SMITH, TRANSFORMING PLACES:
LESSONS FROM APPALACHIA 199 (2012) (describing the introduction of OxyContin
to the market and its detrimental effects).
133. See id. at 200 (“OxyContin sales accelerated from $48 million in 1996 to
a blockbuster $1.1 billion in 2000.”).
134. See id. at 199–200 (describing the great lengths Purdue Pharma would
go to in order to advertise and market OxyContin).
135. See id. at 200 (describing Purdue Pharma’s marketing techniques for
OxyContin in great detail).
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lucrative incentives to its sales representatives. Free starter
vouchers and coupons for OxyContin were made available for
doctors to give to their patients. The company provided doctors
logo-branded OxyContin fishing hats, tote bags, clocks, plush
stuffed toys, and music compact discs.136

Early incentives for doctors to prescribe opioids were intense and
heavily directed at getting physicians to prescribe as many opioid
painkillers as possible.137 These marketing techniques and
incentives laid the foundation for the current state of the opioid
crisis.
2. Current Contribution
Currently, pharmaceutical companies do the bare minimum to
fulfill their legal duty to warn consumers about the dangers of
prescription drugs by merely providing a warning to the
prescribing physician.138 By warning physicians, pharmaceutical
companies decrease their liability and place the duty to actually
warn the consumer in the hands of the doctor.139 The lack of
responsibility on behalf of pharmaceutical companies for the large
amounts of opioids shipped to towns and cities is shocking,
particularly in today’s world of increased corporate social
responsibility.140 For example, nine million opioids were shipped to
a town of only 400 people in West Virginia by a wholesale drug
company.141 Further, an investigation performed by the House
136. Id.
137. See id. (illustrating that the techniques were used to increase revenue
and profit margin more than anything).
138. See Calabro, supra note 16, at 2242–43 (describing the fact that all
pharmaceutical companies have to do now by law is warn consumers).
139. See Calabro, supra note 16, at 2243 (explaining that most of the duty to
enforce limits on opioids ends up falling on the doctors themselves).
140. See Klaus M. Leisinger, The Corporate Social Responsibility of the
Pharmaceutical Industry: Idealism without Illusion and Realism without
Resignation, 15 BUS. ETHICS Q. 577, 577–78 (2005) (referring to the increased
responsibility that pharmaceutical companies should be taking on in the
corporate social responsibility realm).
141. See 9 Million Painkillers Shipped to Tiny West Virginia Town, MSNBC
(Mar.
10,
2017), https://www.msnbc.com/all-in/watch/9-million-painkillersshipped-to-tiny-west-virginia-town-895420995808 (last
visited
Nov.
25,
2019) (describing the large quantity of opioids that flooded into Kermit, W.Va.)
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Energy and Commerce Committee in West Virginia “revealed that
20.8 million hydrocodone and oxycodone pills have been delivered
to Williamson, West Virginia, a town with a community college, a
rail yard—and fewer than 3200 residents, according to the most
recent Census figures,” totaling to more than 6500 pills per
person.142 These two separate instances exemplify an outrageous
ratio that is not being handled or helped by current legislation or
regulation, regardless of efforts to remedy the situation.
Indirect intervention by the pharmaceutical industry through
lobbying and advocacy groups have pushed back on changes to
opioid prescribing patterns through “attempts to halt measures to
restrict opioid overprescribing, efforts to undermine the CDC
guidelines, and thwarting attempts to hold prescribers and
pharmaceutical companies accountable.”143 However, legal action
has been taken against pharmaceutical companies in an attempt
to hold them accountable for their marketing techniques and
distribution.144
A prime example of an attempt to hold pharmaceutical
companies responsible is the string of cases and settlements with
Purdue Pharma.145 Although Purdue Pharma was not the only
pharmaceutical manufacturer distributing opioid products
containing oxycodone, Purdue Pharma’s OxyContin was a focal
point in the conversation of opioid addiction.146 The rapid spread of
opioid abuse captured the attention of local, state, and federal
government officials in the early years of the epidemic, and by
[https://perma.cc/Z6FP-F48Q].
142. Lindsey Bever, A Town of 3,200 Was Flooded with Nearly 21 Million Pain
Pills as Addiction Crisis Worsened, Lawmakers Say, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2018,
3:24 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2018/01/31/
a-town-of-3200-was-flooded-with-21-million-pain-pills-as-addiction-crisisworsened-lawmakers-say/?utm_term=.0741f5fc5540 (last visited Nov. 25, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/UCZ9-EZM7].
143. Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9.
144. See Abby Cunningham, Purpose, Prudence, and Path: Reevaluating the
Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine in the Context of Opioid Litigation, 9 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. ONLINE J. 1, 31 (2017) (referring to the legal proceedings against Purdue
Pharma to hold them accountable for essentially fraud and relaying misleading
information).
145. See id. (referring to the multiple allegations and class actions against the
pharmaceutical company in the 2000s).
146. See id. at 29–30 (describing the centrality of Purdue Pharma in the opioid
addiction conversation).
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2001, the FDA recognized the problems presented by OxyContin,
leading it to contact Purdue Pharma about the agency’s
concerns.147 “The FDA changed OxyContin’s label to include a
‘black box’ warning of the dangers of the product, the strongest
warning label available for an FDA regulated product.”148
Nevertheless, the sale of OxyContin continued to increase due to
Purdue Pharma’s aggressive marketing strategies.149 “[T]he
product had earned the company over $2.8 billion in revenue” by
2001 even with the “negative press and increased governmental
and regulatory scrutiny.”150 In fact, “OxyContin is estimated to
have generated revenues in excess of $30 billion since its entry
onto the market and has been hailed as ‘America’s bestselling
painkiller.’”151 Individuals were able to start bringing product
liability lawsuits and domestic class actions against Purdue
Pharma and other opioid makers beginning in the early 2000s as
the rate of death from opioids increased.152 Although these
lawsuits in the early 2000s had little success, with many ending in
the pleading stage, several settlements in 2019 achieved tangible
results that are leaving their mark on the pharmaceutical
industry.153
The Purdue Pharma settlement of 2007 provided one of the
first specific examples of holding a pharmaceutical company
147. See id. at 30 (referring to the early attempt of the FDA to enforce some
regulations against pharmaceutical companies).
148. Id.
149. See id. (noting that the presence of warning labels accomplished virtually
nothing in terms of deterring the use of OxyContin).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 30–31.
152. See id. at 31 (noting the starting point of lawsuits geared at holding
pharmaceutical companies accountable).
153. See id. (stating that these early opioid “lawsuits met with little success,
ending primarily in the pleading stage”); see also Jackie Fortier & Brian Mann,
Johnson & Johnson Ordered to Pay Oklahoma $572 Million in Opioid Trial, NPR
(Aug.
26,
2019,
4:19
PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2019/08/26/754481268/judge-in-opioid-trial-rules-johnson-johnson-mustpay-oklahoma-572-million (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (detailing “the first ruling
to hold a pharmaceutical company responsible for one of the worst drug epidemics
in American history”) [https://perma.cc/J8XT-TQ5H]; see also Jan Hoffman,
Purdue Pharma Tentatively Settles Thousands of Opioid Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/11/health/purdue-pharma-opioidssettlement.html (last updated Sept. 13, 2019) (last visited Nov. 25, 2019)
(detailing the 2019 Purdue settlement) [https://perma.cc/8F3V-LY4L].
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accountable.154 The company and three current and former
executives pled guilty to criminal charges that they misled
regulators, doctors, and patients about the drug’s risk of addiction
and its potential for abuse.155 As a result, the company agreed to
pay $600 million in fines and other payments to resolve all civil
and criminal charges, the largest amount ever paid by a drug
company in such a case at the time.156 Allegations against Purdue
continued following this settlement, arguing that “defendant
pharmaceutical companies, through a deceptive and unfair
marketing campaign, reversed the medical understanding of
opioids so that prescribing opioids to treat chronic pain long-term
would be commonplace.”157
Following this settlement and several proceedings,
pharmaceutical companies in 2019 were held more directly
accountable than ever before.158 The first of these cases is
illustrated in the Oklahoma v. Johnson & Johnson.159 The
Oklahoma judge in the case ruled that “drugmaker Johnson &
Johnson helped ignite the state’s opioid crisis by deceptively
marketing painkillers.”160 Consequently, the company was ordered

154. See Cunningham, supra note 144, at 30 (providing a solid and more
renowned case example of plaintiffs attacking pharmaceutical companies for their
misguidance on opioid usage); see also Barry Meier, In Guilty Plea, OxyContin
Maker
to
Pay
$600
Million,
N.Y.
TIMES (May
10,
2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/business/11drug-web.html (last visited
Nov. 25, 2019) (detailing the 2007 Purdue settlement) [https://perma.cc/FRA4HS7L].
155. See Meier, supra note 154 (“The company that makes the narcotic
painkiller OxyContin and three current and former executives pleaded guilty
today in federal court here to criminal charges . . . ”).
156. See Meier, supra note 154 (“To resolve criminal and civil charges related
to the drug’s ‘misbranding,’ the parent of Purdue Pharma, the company that
markets OxyContin, agreed to pay some $600 million in fines and other payments,
one of the largest amounts ever paid by a drug company in such a case.”).
157. City of Chicago v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 211 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1062 (N.D.
Ill. 2016); see also Cunningham, supra note 144, at 30 (explaining the Purdue
Pharma litigation that followed the initial 2007 settlement).
158. See, e.g., Fortier & Mann, supra note 153 (describing a 2019 judgment as
“the first ruling to hold a pharmaceutical company responsible for one of the worst
drug epidemics in American history”).
159. See Oklahoma v. Johnson & Johnson, No. CJ-2017-816, 2019 WL
4409690, at *30 (Okla. Aug. 26, 2019) (finding Johnson & Johnson liable).
160. Fortier & Mann, supra note 153.
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to pay $465 million to the state.161 Although Johnson & Johnson
will appeal the judgment, the ruling was a win for those making
efforts to hold pharmaceutical companies accountable for their role
in the opioid crisis.162
The most recent Purdue Pharma settlement concerning
thousands of opioid cases is another illustration of holding these
pharmaceutical companies accountable.163 The broad scope of the
settlement includes: Purdue filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy; the
creation of a new company to continue selling OxyContin and other
medicines, the profits of which will be used to pay the plaintiffs
after the dissolvement of the previous company; the donation of
drugs for addiction treatment and overdose reversal; and the
payment of $3 billion over the course of seven years.164 All of this
being said, the settlement notably does not include any admission
of wrongdoing.165 It is uncertain at this early stage where courts
are seen ruling against pharmaceutical companies whether or not
these rulings and recent settlements will have a lasting or
permanent impact on discouraging the ever increasing sale of
opioids.166 The fact that the pharmaceutical companies as a whole
seem to avoid blame is discouraging, and based on the past, it is
still unknown whether the companies will be held totally
161. See Colin Dwyer & Jackie Fortier, Oklahoma Judge Shaves $107 Million
Off Opioid Decision against Johnson & Johnson, NPR (Nov. 15, 2019, 3:31 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/11/15/779439374/oklahoma-judge-shaves-107-millionoff-opioid-decision-against-johnson-johnson (last visited Nov. 25, 2019)
(describing how the Oklahoma judge initially ordered a $572 million fine but
changed the number due to a calculation error) [https://perma.cc/BG2N-L85L].
162. See Fortier & Mann, supra note 153 (explaining that Judge Balkman’s
ruling affirmed the key legal argument of the state’s case, that the drugmaker
had created a “public nuisance”).
163. See Hoffman, supra note 153 (“Thousands of municipal governments
nationwide and nearly two dozen states that sued the pharmaceutical industry
for the destructive opioid crisis have tentatively reached a settlement with
Purdue Pharma. . . .”); see also In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 2019 WL
3917575, at *83–85, *88 (Ohio Aug. 19, 2019) (providing background and detailing
involvement in the massive opioid litigation Purdue settled).
164. See Hoffman, supra note 153 (detailing the tentative settlement
agreement which remains to be approved by a bankruptcy judge).
165. See Hoffman, supra note 153 (noting that neither the company nor the
owning family admit any wrong doing in terms of marketing techniques or
otherwise).
166. See Hoffman, supra note 153 (discussing the ambiguities of the Johnson
& Johnson settlement).
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accountable by the courts, but the recent settlements do provide
hope.167
Regardless of the lawsuits and regulations put in place to keep
pharmaceutical companies in check, the pharmaceutical industry
continues to exercise tremendous economic influence over
physicians and the health care industry.168 Americans spend
trillions on health care, and this amount seems to constantly be on
the rise.169 Along with excessive expenses on health care,
“[p]harmaceutical companies are exerting increasing pressure on
physicians’ prescription patterns through various means,
including providing gifts and other benefits for brand loyalty.”170
The pharmaceutical industry annually spends roughly $12 billion
promoting and marketing their products to physicians through
gifting, travel reimbursements, and meal expenses.171 Spending at
this level could lead to questions regarding the quality of patient
care if the physician’s financial motives exceed patient needs.172
Although the kickback programs of the 1990s and early 2000s have
recently been checked by regulations, the advertisement and
intense marketing on behalf of the pharmaceutical companies
continues.173 In fact, doctors who prescribe large amounts of
opioids still receive large payments from drug makers, according
to an analysis by CNN and researchers at Harvard University.174
167. See Fortier & Mann, supra note 153 (citing the fact that Johnson &
Johnson is appealing and this could be reversed in the future particularly given
the unusual grounds on which they were found culpable); see also Hoffman, supra
note 153 (noting that Purdue still avoids admitting responsibility and that casts
some doubt over whether the settlement will be approved by the bankruptcy
judge).
168. See Calabro, supra note 16, at 2256–57 (referring to the fact that
pharmaceutical companies still have a strong hold on doctors economically
regardless of the regulations currently in place).
169. See Calabro, supra note 16, at 2257 (noting that the healthcare industry
is a huge money-making industry).
170. Calabro, supra note 16, at 2257.
171. See Calabro, supra note 16, at 2257 (describing the extravagant spending
of pharmaceutical companies).
172. See Calabro, supra note 16, at 2258 (noting that a conflict of interest can
easily be created with the physician stuck in a conflict between their duties to
patients and financial needs).
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b (2012) (providing the kickback statute put in
place to keep financial incentives out of patient care).
174. See The More Opioids Doctors Prescribe, the More They Get Paid, HARV.
T.H. CHAN: SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/hsph-in-
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B. Doctors’ Role in the Crisis
1. Bad Habits

Over the years, doctors have also contributed significantly to
the crisis.175 Unfortunately, they have done so through both illegal
and legal methods.176 Doctors have been caught illegally
prescribing opioid painkillers outside the scope of their
professional practice for non-medical purposes.177 Illegal
prescribing methods are not the focus of legislation because illegal
actions are impossible to regulate at the civil level, and are left to
the realm of criminal authority.178 Nonetheless, the actions of
crooked doctors need to be mentioned because of their contribution
to the opioid crisis.179
Some doctors have also been found to prescribe very dangerous
combinations of opioids or large quantities of drugs legally,
contributing to the crisis.180 For example, individuals are
the-news/opioids-doctors-prescriptions-payments/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2019)
(discussing the cycle of doctors prescribing large quantities of opioids and in turn
making more money) [https://perma.cc/HUJ7-FWBB]; see also Partnership News
Service Staff, Drug Makers Pay Doctors Who Prescribe Large Amounts of Opioids,
Analysis Finds, DRUGFREE.ORG (Mar. 15, 2018), https://drugfree.org/learn/drugand-alcohol-news/drug-makers-pay-doctors-prescribe-large-amounts-opioidsanalysis-finds/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (“The more opioids doctors prescribe,
the more money they receive.”) [https://perma.cc/WX2W-98M8].
175. See Calabro, supra note 16, at 2256–60 (noting that, in addition to
pharmaceutical companies, doctors are to blame for drug safety problems).
176. See Moody Pill Mill Doctor, supra note 15 (“Federal
prosecutors . . . charged a Vestavia Hills physician with illegally prescribing
controlled substances, including opioid painkillers. . . .”); see also Kelly K. Dineen
& James M. DuBois, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Can Physicians Prescribe
Opioids to Treat Pain Adequately While Avoiding Legal Sanction?, 42 AM. J. LAW
MED. 7, 8 (2016) (describing instances in which physicians may be acting
negligently in prescribing opioids and not suffer legal consequences because they
are merely not acting with the appropriate duty of care).
177. See Moody Pill Mill Doctor, supra note 15 (noting that agencies like the
DOJ are coming for physicians and medical providers who abuse their positions
and prescribing authority).
178. See Moody Pill Mill Doctor, supra note 15 (“‘Doctors prescribing opioids
within the bounds of legitimate medicine are not the focus of the Department of
Justice.’” (quoting Assistant U.S. Attorney Mohammad Khatib)).
179. See Moody Pill Mill Doctor, supra note 15 (noting the connection between
illegal prescription methods and the opioid crisis).
180. See CDC NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, supra note
8, at 8 (describing the high prescribing rate which has been on the decline since
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sometimes prescribed both benzodiazepines and opioid drugs
simultaneously—a common denominator with individuals that
end up addicted to prescription opioids.181 “In a study of over
300,000 continuously insured patients receiving opioid
prescriptions between 2001 and 2013, the percentage of persons
also prescribed benzodiazepines rose to 17 percent in 2013 from
nine percent in 2001.”182 The study illustrated that people
concurrently using both drugs are at a higher risk of visiting the
emergency department or being admitted to a hospital for a
drug-related emergency.183 And interestingly, physicians are the
ones allowing these prescribing rates even with the statistics and
knowledge that the opioid combination can cause an increased risk
of drug-related issues.184
Not only are physicians prescribing dangerous combinations,
they are also prescribing large quantities of opioids which are
equally dangerous to the creation of addicts.185 Studies performed
on emergency room statistics illustrate the problem.186 According
to the findings of a study from Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public
Health and Harvard Medical School, “[e]mergency room patients
treated by physicians who prescribe opioids more often are at
greater risk for long-term opioid use even after a single
prescription than those who see less-frequent prescribers.”187
2012 but is still three times higher than it was in 1999).
181. See Benzodiazepines and Opioids, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE,
https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates
(last updated Jan. 2019) (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (describing the common drug
cocktail prescribed by physicians for pain) [https://perma.cc/D4XV-3JVB].
182. Id.
183. See id. (noting the increase in risk as a result of the doctors’ drug
concoction).
184. See id. (describing the interesting fact that physicians continue to
prescribe these dangerous opioid combinations even with the warnings and
knowledge).
185. See CDC NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, supra note 8,
at 8 (describing the high prescribing rates of physicians in the United States
which is still dangerously high).
186. See Physicians’ Opioid Prescribing Patterns Linked to Patients’ Risk for
Long-term Drug Use, HARV. T.H. CHAN: SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH (Feb. 15, 2017),
https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/press-releases/opioids-addiction-physicians/
(last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (basing the findings on accounts from Boston, Mass.
emergency rooms) [https://perma.cc/59QP-LDXM].
187. Id.
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However, it is not merely a problem of the emergency room, the
specific physician a patient sees is equally important.188 For
example, in the same study conducted by the Harvard T.H. Chan
School of Public Health and Harvard Medical School,
[a]though the physicians saw patients with similar complaints,
they treated them differently. On the low end of the spectrum,
one quarter of providers gave opioid prescriptions to just 7
percent of the patients they saw. At the other extreme, the top
quarter of prescribers gave opioids to 24 percent of their
patients.189

However, case law on physician liability for overprescribing
medication that leads to the development of patient addiction is
conflicting.190 On one hand, courts have found physicians liable in
cases where the physician prescribed too much medication.191
Findings like this may be because the physician did not have
proper cause to prescribe the amount of opioids that they did, or
because the physicians failed to conduct a proper investigation.192
These cases frequently show that the number of pills issued greatly
exceeded the recommended dosage, or that the prescriptions
continued to be refilled without a physical examination, leading
courts to find physicians at fault even though what they were doing
was in fact legal within the provided statutes and regulations.193
Cases like these contrast with other courts who found physicians
not liable because the physicians did not fail to warn the patient
and therefore did not breach his or her duty to warn.194
188. See id. (providing other examples of average physicians who also
arguably over prescribe opioids).
189. Id.
190. See Jack Hubbard et al., Opioid Abuse: The Fall of a Prince, 21
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 159, 190 (2018) (providing that the case law on physician
opioid prescribing has gone both ways).
191. See United States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 564 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding
doctors liable for prescribing too many opioids in a criminal proceeding).
192. See Hubbard et al., supra note 190 (“Some courts have found physicians
liable in cases where the physician prescribed too much medication without
proper cause or failed to conduct a proper investigation.”).
193. See Duarte v. Zachariah, 22 Cal. App. 4th 1652, 1665 (1994) (holding a
physician liable for negligent over-prescription).
194. See Posner v. Walker, 930 So. 2d 659, 667 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)
(holding that doctor was not liable, even though he failed to warn the patient of
the dangers of opioid use).
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2. Recent Improvements
There have been recent improvements in the healthcare
industry in terms of clearer guidelines for physicians and fewer
opioid prescriptions, a change from the previously constant
increase in prescriptions from year to year.195 For example,
[h]ealthcare providers wrote 72.4 opioid prescriptions per 100
persons in 2006. This rate increased annually by 3.0% from
2006 to 2010, decreased 1.6% annually from 2010 to 2014, and
continued to decrease annually by 8.2% until 2017, reaching a
rate of 58.5 prescriptions per 100 persons. This represents an
overall relative reduction of 19.2% from 2006 to 2017.196

The reduction in prescriptions per person illustrates improvement,
but the crisis is still not greatly improving.197 For instance, “[i]n
2017, 17.4% of the U.S. population received one or more opioid
prescriptions, with the average person receiving 3.4
prescriptions.”198 In short, experts still find that the
overprescribing of opioid painkillers in the late 1990s contributed
to widespread misuse of the drugs, and regardless of recent
improvements, “[o]verdose deaths from prescription and
nonprescription opioids were five times higher in 2016 than in
1999.”199

195. See Julie Appleby & Elizabeth Lucas, Doctors Can Change Opioid
Prescribing Habits, But Progress Comes in Small Doses, KAISER HEALTH NEWS
(Aug. 14, 2019), https://khn.org/news/doctors-opioid-prescribing-habits-changecomes-in-small-doses/ (last visited on Nov. 25, 2019) (discussing the
implementation of guidelines which have decreased the amount of opioids
prescribed) [https://perma.cc/PA6G-MXUB].
196. CDC NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, supra note 8, at
6.
197. See CDC NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, supra note 8,
at 6 (discussing the reduction in opioid prescriptions per person as being
beneficial to solving the crisis).
198. CDC NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, supra note 8, at
6.
199. Nat’l Inst. on Drug Abuse, Misuse of Prescription Drugs, DRUGABUSE.GOV,
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/misuse-prescription-drugs/overview
(last updated Dec. 2018) (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) [https://perma.cc/B5FNRPJT].
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V. Moving Forward
A. The Creation of a Federal Model Law

Moving forward, a lobby for reasonable legislation in the form
of a federal model law is a possible solution to fix the current state
of the crisis at the civil level.200 Model laws are beneficial tools that
set national standards and guidelines.201 Each state would need to
pass the law in order for it to be entirely effective, and in the
process, states may alter pieces of the act, but regardless, the
implementation of a federal model law could be the best avenue,
considering previous legislation and regulations have not been
completely successful.202 A model law governing the prescription
opioid industry could involve monitoring the pharmaceutical
companies, further regulation of physician prescribing methods,
and perhaps the implementation of a sort of vice tax or at least
increased licensing requirements for pharmaceutical companies
while at the same time not greatly affecting the profit margins of
pharmaceutical companies.
1. Monitoring the Pharmaceutical Companies
For starters, it would prove beneficial to do away with
financial incentives for prescribing opioids.203 A conflict of interest
200. See BONNIE ET AL., supra note 10, at 301 (noting studies that “suggest
that, despite the existence of various guidelines, pain assessment, and
reassessment and some other provisions of the guidelines are not always adhered
to, and . . . pain control can be improved when guidelines are followed”) (citations
omitted).
201. See Legal Info. Inst., Uniform Laws, CORNELL L. SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (establishing the
difference between uniform laws and model acts and acknowledging that the goal
of model acts is reform as opposed to uniformity) [https://perma.cc/WJ5Q-NAEB].
202. See id. (“Those creating model acts contemplate that state legislatures
may make alterations or even take bits and pieces.”).
203. See Charles Orenstein et al., Drug-Company Payments Mirror Doctors’
Brand-Name
Prescribing,
NPR
(Mar.
17,
2016,
5:00
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/03/17/470679452/drug-companypayments-mirror-doctors-brand-name-prescribing (last visited Nov. 25, 2019)
(discussing the conversations between doctors on how there is not much difference
between name brand and generic drugs but that doctors receive payments for
prescribing the name brand ones) [https://perma.cc/N459-Y7RF].
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can be created when the professional judgment of a physician is
influenced by a secondary interest such as financial incentives.204
“A physician has a professional duty to provide for his patients’
welfare, yet this duty can be compromised when pressure is
exerted by pharmaceutical companies,” and although not all
doctors are influenced by the pharmaceutical companies, this is the
state of the market.205 More than 83,000 pharmaceutical
representatives regularly visit physicians, hospitals, and
pharmacies with intense marketing techniques and reasons why
the medical professional should use the next big opioid.206 A model
law keeping these marketing techniques in check could prove
beneficial in helping the state of the opioid crisis just like other
model laws, such as the NAIC Model Laws, which focus on
consumer protection and ensuring at least some uniformity in
insurance across state lines.207
Closer regulation of pharmaceutical distributorship is another
aspect that could be implemented by a model law.208 There is an
obvious issue with the number of opioids that are shipped to small
rural towns, as evident by the cases in West Virginia.209 “Primary
pharmaceutical distributors are solely responsible for the safe and
efficient distribution of all medications, including controlled
substances, from drug manufacturers to licensed pharmacies and
other healthcare providers.”210 Although distributors claim to
204. See Calabro, supra note 16, at 2258 (describing conflicts of interest
created by financial kickbacks provided by the pharmaceutical companies).
205. Calabro, supra note 16, at 2258.
206. See Calabro, supra note 16, at 2258 (noting that pharmaceutical
companies are constantly marketing their product with high intensity).
207. See
NAIC
Model
Laws,
NAIC,
https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_naic_ model_laws.htm (last updated Sept.
26, 2019) (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (citing the NAIC Model Laws as an example
that assists in balancing the needs of the insurance companies and the consumer
with a strong emphasis on consumer protection) [https://perma.cc/MB37-GBBS].
208. See The Opioid Epidemic: Are Drug Manufacturers Liable?, NAT’L
PARALEGAL
C.,
https://nationalparalegal.edu/ViewNews.aspx?intTakeOnNewsID=108
(last
visited Nov. 25, 2019) (noting that regulations “play[] a role in trying to stem the
opioid crisis”) [https://perma.cc/MG7X-Y8AE].
209. See 9 Million Painkillers Shipped to Tiny West Virginia Town, supra note
141 (providing an example of significant amounts of opioids shipped to small
towns where the ratio of opioids to people is shocking).
210. The Rest of the Story: Facts about Pharmaceutical Distributors and the
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merely fulfill orders from entities licensed by the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) and state regulatory
authorities, the gross proportions of opioids to people, as
illustrated by the cases in West Virginia, should arguably cause
the average distributor to pause.211 Regulations keeping
distributors in check would be beneficial for this reason.212
Through regulation, the distributors would be held responsible for
their actions and would not merely be able to hide behind an excuse
that they were just following orders.213
Encouraging the pharmaceutical industry to pursue research
and development of new treatment and medications as opposed to
the highly addictive opioids is another option for helping the
industry.214 As recently as November 2018, the pharmaceutical
company AcelRx introduced a potent new opioid painkiller,
Dsuvia, a 3-millimeter-wide tablet of sufentanil.215 The drug was
introduced to the FDA and then approved despite warnings from
physicians who say the drug will contribute to the opioid
epidemic.216 Although the FDA’s approval speaks to its role in the
Opioid Crisis, HEALTHCARE DISTRIBUTION ALLIANCE (May 18, 2017),
https://www.hda.org/news/facts-about-rx-distributors-and-the-opioid-crisis (last
visited Nov. 25, 2019) [hereinafter The Rest of the Story] [https://perma.cc/BA2Q99Q7].
211. See id. (“Wholesale distributors are not ‘pill mills.’ Distributors fulfill
orders only from entities licensed by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) and state regulatory authorities.”).
212. See The Opioid Epidemic: Are Drug Manufacturers Liable?, supra note
208 (referencing the laws and regulations relating to marketing and other
practices relating to the distribution of opioids, which are regulated but contain
lot of holes).
213. See The Rest of the Story, supra note 210 (noting that some distributors
argue that they are only fulfilling the orders given to them by licensed physicians
and that they are not in charge of making medical determinations).
214. See Non-Opioid Treatment, AM. SOC’Y OF ANESTHESIOLOGISTS,
https://www.asahq.org/whensecondscount/pain-management/non-opioidtreatment/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (describing several alternatives to opioids
for pain relief that are just as successful) [https://perma.cc/63LF-TRPV].
215. See Jake Harper, Despite Warnings, FDA Approves Potent New Opioid
Painkiller, NPR (Nov. 2, 2018, 3:05 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2018/11/02/663395669/despite-warnings-fda-approves-potent-new-opioidpainkiller (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (providing that sufentanil is potent and
Dsuvia was opposed by many physicians and individuals working against the
opioid crisis) [https://perma.cc/B9FS-9F8U].
216. See id. (“The Food and Drug Administration has approved a potent new
opioid painkiller, despite warnings from physician critics. . . .”).
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crisis as well, many critics believe Dsuvia contributes nothing new
or unique to the market and is frankly unnecessary.217 In light of
the introduction of Dsuvia and multiple other prescription pain
medications flooding the market, discouraging pharmaceutical
companies from continuing the creation of new opioid painkillers
in lieu of other options as scientists and researchers discover other
ways to deal with pain could be another solution to helping end the
epidemic.218 Nonopioid alternatives to pain relief could be
encouraged with the FDA’s assistance and the guidance of a model
law discouraging the further manufacture of highly addictive
opioid pain medication.219
2. Regulating Prescribing Methods of Doctors
Regulating doctors more clearly concerning dosage and
duration amounts as opposed to arbitrary guidelines would also
add a beneficial aspect to the proposed model law.220 Many consider
doctors’ habits of overprescribing medications to blame.221 By
placing a portion of the blame on physicians, the burden is not
completely on the pharmaceutical companies, giving doctors the
responsibility to know their patients’ needs and treat them
217. See id. (quoting Dr. Sidney Wolfe, senior adviser to Public Citizen’s
Health Research Group, as saying that Dsuvia is “not unique at all,” that it was
not “adequately tested in emergency settings,” and that pain relief from the drug
was “slow”) (omitting internal quotations).
218. See Phil Skolnick & Nora D. Volkow, Re-Energizing the Development of
Pain Therapeutics in Light of the Opioid Epidemic, 92 NEURON 294, 294–96 (2016)
(discussing scientific background on the subject and the opportunities that exist
to explore alternative pain reliefs).
219. See Robert M. Califf et al., A Proactive Response to Prescription Opioid
Abuse, NEW ENG. J. MED. 1480, 1483 (2016) (“The FDA has approved nonopioid
medications for treatment of various chronic-pain syndromes, including
gabapentin (Neurontin), pregabalin (Lyrica), milnacipran (Savella), duloxetine
(Cymbalta), and others . . . .”).
220. See BONNIE ET AL., supra note 10, at 301–04 (suggesting better guidelines
for physicians).
221. See Bethany Bump, Are Doctors to Blame for Opioid Crisis? New Yorkers
Think So, TIMES UNION, https://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Are-doctors-toblame-for-opioid-crisis-New-12851255.php (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (noting
that when New Yorkers were “asked to pick a single contributor they believe is
most responsible for the opioid crisis most . . . picked doctors who overprescribed”)
[https://perma.cc/9TFN-WWQK].
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adequately.222 “The subject of guidelines for acute pain
management currently revolves primarily around use rather than
dosage or duration.”223 Although dosage guidelines are widely
available and accepted, opioids prescribed for acute pain
syndromes are often provided at dosing intervals and durations
unlikely to yield optimal effects.224 If these guidelines were more
directed at dosage amounts and duration, while at the same time
more focused on a unified basis at the federal level through a model
law, there could be better results.225 Patients’ reliance on opioids
to manage pain could then be helped as other forms of pain
management are introduced as opposed to large amounts of
opioids.226
A Virginia regulation passed in the fall of 2018 provides
another framework for the model law to follow regarding the
regulation of doctors.227 The regulation tightens even further how
and when a practitioner may prescribe opioids, but does not apply
to patients receiving pain treatment for cancer, sickle cell, hospice,
or palliative care.228 By regulating in this manner, the individuals
who need opioids can access them without a lot regulatory red tape
while the opioids themselves remain under strict regulation.229 The
regulation makes it very clear to the medical profession that if
physicians do not abide by the regulation, then they will not be
222. See id. (providing survey results indicating that New Yorkers believe
that there are several factors, in addition to doctors’ over-prescription, that have
led to the opioid epidemic).
223. BONNIE ET AL., supra note 10, at 299.
224. But see BONNIE ET AL., supra note 10, at 300 (providing an example of
guidelines which “call for opioids. . . to be issued in carefully limited amounts . . .
after education of the patient concerning appropriate use and storage”).
225. See BONNIE ET AL., supra note 10, at 301 (noting that better guidelines
that are more unified regarding opioids could be more beneficial).
226. See BONNIE ET AL., supra note 10, at 295 (stating that physicians often
receive inadequate pain management training and noting that “[a] consequence
of this failure in education is that . . . some patients receive the wrong treatment
and/or medications”).
227. See Rodney K. Adams, Virginia Regulations Governing Prescribing of
Opioids, VA. LAW. MAG. FOR ST. BAR, Feb. 2019, at 18 (describing the new
regulation and that physicians should ensure they remain in compliance).
228. See id. (noting that the regulation is strict but does not apply to groups
that sincerely need opioids because of the amount of pain they have to endure).
229. See id. (“Of note is that these regulations are focused on out-patient
care.”).
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able to continue to prescribe opioids because their license will be
revoked.230 Virginia’s regulation could be a useful tool in
formulating a model law by allowing doctors to treat the patients
who need opioids while at the same time ensuring doctors are not
negligently prescribing opioids to those who do not.231
3. Implementing a Financial Burden to
Pharmaceutical Companies
One of the more interesting yet also difficult pieces to
implement into a model law aimed at curbing the opioid crisis is a
sort of tax on pharmaceutical companies.232 New York is the only
state to pass a system like this thus far, but it did not last long.233
Opioid makers and distributors fought the law because it aimed to
collect hundreds of millions of dollars from the industry in order to
help defray costs of the opioid crisis.234 Pharmaceutical companies
argued in three legal challenges filed in recent months that the
law, which sought $600 million over six years, was
unconstitutional.235 The concept behind imposing a tax could prove
beneficial as billions of dollars in government revenue could be
generated from the tax to fight addiction and overdose.236 Even
230. See id. at 20 (“A physician should immediately review their practices to
assure compliance with these detailed regulations for the safety of their patients
and their license.”).
231. See id. at 18–20 (outlining the regulations’ requirements).
232. See Farmer, supra note 112 (looking into the idea of the tax on
pharmaceutical companies as implemented through states in the past several
years).
233. See A Unique New York Law Allows State to Collect Taxes from Opioid
Makers to Defray Cost of Crisis. Companies Are Not Happy About It., KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 20, 2018), https://khn.org/morning-breakout/a-unique-newyork-law-allows-state-to-collect-taxes-from-opioid-makers-to-defray-cost-ofcrisis-companies-are-not-happy-about-it/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (illustrating
the trials being faced by the lawmakers of New York being the lone state to pass
a system like this taxing pharmaceutical companies) [https://perma.cc/22WZNET4].
234. See id. (describing the scene in New York as pharmaceutical companies
fought and ultimately won in court that the tax law was constitutional and
unenforceable).
235. Id.
236. See Farmer, supra note 112 (noting the potential benefits of
implementing a tax against pharmaceutical companies which could directly be
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though several states have already tried and failed to pass opioid
taxes, lawmakers in those states say they will try again in 2019,
and with dozens continuing to sue opioid makers and distributors,
it is possible pharmaceutical companies could begin to buckle as
lawmakers crack down.237 More guidance and support could be
implemented through a federal model law suggesting how to tax or
increase licensing fees on the industry.238
4. Possible Roadblocks
Unfortunately, there are potential obstacles facing the
passage of a model law of this magnitude.239 For starters, getting
past the pharmaceutical lobby and influence in general will be
difficult.240 Their lobby is very strong and influential when it comes
to lawmaking as evident by the previous laws and regulations
Congress has attempted to pass in an effort to handle the opioid
crisis.241 Difficulty in passing laws regarding the opioid crisis has
been illustrated in the past as the pharmaceutical company lobby
is able to funnel millions of dollars into stopping bills that would
funneled back into assisting those fighting opioid addiction and the crisis in
general).
237. See Randazzo, supra note 124 (referencing the U.S. district court in Ohio
allowing a large group of opioid tax-related lawsuits to move forward); see also
Bob Salsberg, Baker Tax Plan Would Hit Firms that Make Opioid Drugs, WBUR
90.9 (Jan. 26, 2019), https://www.wbur.org/commonhealth/2019/01/26/bakeropioid-excise-tax (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (discussing the high-profile attempt
by Governor Baker of Massachusetts to tax manufacturers of opioids)
[https://perma.cc/ZM49-LA9R].
238. See Farmer, supra note 112 and accompanying text.
239. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (discussing the barriers created by
pharmaceutical lobbyists); see also Jeff Bendix, Opioid Policy Fallout,
MEDICALECONOMICS.COM
(May
30,
2018),
https://www.medicaleconomics.com/article/opioid-policy-fallout (last visited Nov.
25, 2019) (discussing the concern that regulating the prescription of painkillers
will hinder doctors’ ability to properly treat patients) [https://perma.cc/Q78FZWH6].
240. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (“Attempts to change opioid prescribing
patterns have been opposed primarily by indirect intervention by the
pharmaceutical industry through lobbying and advocacy groups.”).
241. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (stating that pharmaceutical companies
“attempt[] to halt measures to restrict opioid overprescribing . . . undermine the
CDC guidelines, and thwart[] attempts to hold prescribers and pharmaceutical
companies accountable”).
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crack down on regulating the sale and distribution of opioids.242
“Hundreds of millions of dollars flow to lobbyists and politicians on
Capitol Hill each year to shape laws and policies that keep drug
company profits growing.”243 The pharmaceutical industry has
approximately two lobbyists for every member of Congress and
spent $152 million on influencing legislation in 2016, according to
the Center for Responsive Politics, while contributing more than
$20 million directly to political campaigns in 2015.244 These
contributions to campaigns are hard to ignore, and are evidence of
how closely tied the pharmaceutical industry is to Congress
through their lobby and funding which presents a possible issue in
passing a model law of the magnitude proposed to keep the
pharmaceutical industry in check.245 That being said, Senate
committees and investigative journalists have scrutinized the
financial associations of opioid manufacturers and patient
advocacy and professional organizations.246 They recognize the
major concern that “opposition to regulatory, payment, or clinical
policies to reduce opioid use may originate from groups that stand
to lose financially if sales of opioids decline.”247 As a result, most
find that greater transparency is required concerning the financial
242. See Chris McGreal, How Big Pharma’s Money—and Its Politicians—Feed
the U.S. Opioid Crisis, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 19, 2017, 6:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/oct/19/big-pharma-money-lobbyingus-opioid-crisis (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (referencing the substantial
contribution from pharmaceutical companies to politicians and campaigning
against
bills
further
regulating
the
pharmaceutical
industry)
[https://perma.cc/USQ4-QNXZ].
243. Id.
244. See id. (“Drugmakers have poured close to $2.5 billion into lobbying and
funding members of Congress over the past decade.”); see also Ctr. for Responsive
Politics, Industry Profile: Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/induscode.php?id=H4300&year=2016
(last
visited Nov. 25, 2019) (comparing campaign contributions from the
pharmaceutical industry for the year 2016 totaling $152,852,025)
[https://perma.cc/5HPL-F6WW].
245. See McGreal, supra note 242 (“Pharmaceutical companies spend far more
than any other industry to influence politicians.”).
246. See Dora H. Lin et al., Financial Conflicts of Interest and the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention’s 2016 Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for
Chronic Pain, 177 JAMA INTERN. MED. 427, 427–28 (2017) (referencing a study
performed by researchers on 158 organizations that submitted information to the
CDC on their reformed guidelines regarding opioids).
247. Id. at 428.
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relationships between opioid manufacturers and patient and
professional groups in order to improve the opioid crisis, but the
reality is that it is hard to compete with financial backing.248
There also has to be an understanding and acknowledgment
that some patients need opioids and balancing that with the law.249
The concern among physicians and public health and pain
management experts is that laws and regulations designed to
limit use of prescription narcotics, however well-intentioned,
are yet another constraint on doctors’ ability to treat patients
as they think best. Worse, they say, some of the limitations on
prescribing could result in patients turning to heroin or buying
the medications on the street. And because heroin in particular
now is often laced with fentanyl and other synthetic painkillers,
doing so astronomically increases the risk of death.250

Concerns regarding pain management are not unfounded.251 Some
patients need opioid pain killers and the further regulation of
opioids and pharmaceutical companies could complicate matters in
getting opioids to those who truly need them.252 PhRMA Deputy
Vice President Priscilla VanderVeer has expressed her concerns
that prescription medications such as Vicodin or Oxycodone are
important treatment for some patients, and that the proposed laws
would punitively affect those drugs across the board.253 Concerns
248. See id. at 427–28 (describing the results from the study performed and
the need for greater transparency in the relationship between pharmaceutical
companies and the rest of the population).
249. See Bendix, supra note 239 (acknowledging that the opioid crisis needs
to be addressed in a manner that will not deprive chronic pain patients of
necessary medication).
250. Bendix, supra note 239.
251. See Marilyn Serafini, The Physicians’ Quandary with Opioids: Pain
Versus
Addiction,
NEJM
CATALYST
(Apr.
26,
2018),
https://catalyst.nejm.org/quandary-opioids-chronic-pain-addiction/ (last visited
Nov. 25, 2019) (describing the case of physicians who are frustrated with the
difficulties when it comes to prescribing opioids to patients who need pain relief)
[https://perma.cc/D9T6-XLKC].
252. See id. (referencing patients who suffer from chronic pain and need the
medications in question); see also Lauren Vogel, More Regulation Not the Answer
for Opioids, CMAJ, Sept. 22, 2015, at 957 (“[P]atients who legitimately need the
drugs face greater barriers to access, and those using opioids to get high simply
move on to a more readily available agent.”).
253. See Farmer, supra note 112 (“There are people who need access to those
medicines . . . We want to make sure we’re not making these people who need it
feel like criminals.”).
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about affecting individuals who need pain medication is the main
argument on behalf of pharmaceutical companies, and it has its
merits, but better regulations and guidelines overall are arguably
better than no regulation at all.254 The issue is not that opioids
themselves are bad.255 The issue is that pharmaceutical companies
and distributors are placing millions of highly addictive opioids in
the hands of individuals who are being prescribed painkillers at
high rates with little regulation.256
VI. Conclusion
The grip that pharmaceutical companies maintain on society
is a problem.257 It is arguably the root of the opioid crisis that was
jumpstarted by the transmission of bad information that opioids
were non-addictive in the early 1990s.258 The crisis then continued
to worsen as pharmaceutical companies realized the profit margins
they stood to gain off of the sale of opioid pain killers and continued
to ship opioids out by the millions even after the death tolls started
to rise.259 The pharmaceutical industry continues to stand virtually
untouchable in terms of statutes and regulations that are seeking
to protect the American people.260 With their constant involvement
254. See, e.g., The Opioid Epidemic: What Can We Learn from Europe?,
CLEVELAND CLINIC (Aug. 14, 2018), https://consultqd.clevelandclinic.org/theopioid-epidemic-what-can-we-learn-from-europe/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2019)
(providing interviews with pain management experts who describe the situation
in Europe where the regulations are much tighter and they have significantly
fewer opioid overdoses) [https://perma.cc/4W2S-33RF].
255. See Teresa A. Rummans et al., How Good Intentions Contributed to Bad
Outcomes: The Opioid Crisis, 93 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 344, 348 (2018) (describing
the fact that opioids came with good intentions to treat pain and help individuals).
256. See id. (noting that the current state of the opioid crisis is not the fault
of any one group or organization but the product of multiple factors that need to
be addressed).
257. See supra notes 239–245 and accompanying text (discussing the
influence that pharmaceutical companies have on lawmakers).
258. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (explaining how pharmaceutical
companies contributed to a spike in opioid prescriptions).
259. See Nat’l Inst. on Drug Abuse, supra note 6 (providing statistics
demonstrating that the “main driver of drug overdose deaths were opioids . . .
with a 12.9-fold increase from 2007 to 2017”).
260. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (discussing the pervasive effort by
pharmaceutical lobbyists to stymie legal reform).
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in Congress, and money distributed to physicians and campaigns,
the pharmaceutical companies have made themselves even harder
to touch in terms of holding them accountable.261 Although recent
settlements and decisions provide room for optimism, it is still
uncertain whether these decisions will make an impact on the
industry as a whole.262 However, hope remains.263 It is possible
through the implementation of a reasonable, yet stricter, set of
federal guidelines imposed through the form of a model law
regulating both pharmaceutical companies and doctors, there
could be significant improvement in the efforts to end the opioid
crisis plaguing America.264

261. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (noting research that “found that the
opposition to the CDC guidelines was significantly more common among
organizations that received funding from opioid manufacturers”); see also
Calabro, supra note 16, at 2258 (“More than 83,000 pharmaceutical
representatives regularly visit physicians, hospitals, and pharmacies laden with
expensive gifts.”).
262. See supra notes 165–166 and accompanying text (acknowledging that,
although these cases are tentative and not entirely satisfying, they seem to be a
step in the direction of pharmaceutical companies taking accountability).
263. See supra notes 200–238 and accompanying text (discussing a path that
could help to alleviate the opioid crisis).
264. See supra notes 200–238 and accompanying text (recommending the
introduction of a model law and discussing the positive impact that a model law
could have on the opioid crisis).

